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Abstract 
The high volume of traffic across modern networks entails 
use of accurate and reliable automated tools for intrusion 
detection. The capacity for data mining and machine learning 
algorithms to learn rules from data are typically constrained 
by the random nature of training and test data; diversity and 
disparity of models and related parameters and limitations in 
data sharing. We propose an ensemble method for intrusion 
detection which conforms to variability in data. Trained on a 
high-dimensional 82332x27 data attributes cyber-attack data 
variables for classification by Decision Trees (DT). Its 
novelty derives from iterative training and testing several DT 
models on multiple high-dimensional samples aimed at 
separating the types of attacks. Unlike Random Forests, the 
number of variables, p, isn’t altered to enable identification 
of the importance of predictor variables. It also minimises the 
influence of multicollinearity and strength of individual trees. 
Results show that the ensemble model conforms to data 
variability and yields more insightful predictions on 
multinomial targets.   
Keywords: Bagging, Classification, Cross-Validation, 
Cyber-Security, Data Mining, Decision Trees, Intrusion 
Detection, Over-fitting, Random Forest 
1 Introduction 
The need for reliable automated tools for intrusion detection 
has been steadily growing with data traffic across networks. 
Various data mining and machine learning applications have 
been developed and applied in cyber-security [1] and [2]. 
However, the capacity for these algorithms to learn and 
generalise rules from data are typically constrained by the 
random nature of training and test data; diversity and 
disparity of models and related parameters and limitations in 
data sharing. We propose an ensemble method for intrusion 
detection which conforms to variability in data. It consists of 
multiple models trained and tested on high-dimensional 
subsamples from an 82,332x27 data source, iteratively 
compiling and averaging classification results over repeated 
runs. While its main ideas derive from Bayesian statistics [3], 
domain partitioning [4] and Bagging [5], it proceeds from 
dimensional reduction to classification utilising multiple 
samples and multiple models. That way, it addresses issues of 
randomness in predictive modelling. The algorithm’s novelty 
derives from the foregoing features and its adaptability to 
different algorithms. The paper’s objectives are two-fold    
1) To develop, train and test an ensemble model that 
conforms to data variability. 
2) To carry out predictive modelling of intrusion using 
high-dimensional historical data. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents previous 
work relating to cyber-attack predictions. Methods follow in 
Section 3 and data analyses, results and discussions are in 
Section 4. Concluding remarks and recommended potential 
future directions are in Section 5.   
2 Background 
Exploitation of vulnerabilities in computer systems remains a 
major issue among system administrators responsible for 
protecting data in all fields. System administrators typically 
resort to a variety of techniques in their quest to evade 
intrusion - including a variety of intrusion detection/intrusion 
prevention (IDS/IPS) solutions, typically in combination with 
firewalls [6]. These highly-correlated detection and 
prevention activities are generic in monitoring package traffic 
flows, recording, analysing intervening where necessary [7]. 
Related approaches include “host-network-application” 
based intrusion detection techniques which compare inbound 
and outbound packet flow patterns to “expected” patterns [8]. 
Signature-based intrusion detection techniques trace “specific 
signatures” such as byte combinations but despite their 
relatively higher accuracy, they remain vulnerable due to 
their sole dependency on the contents of current ontologies. 
Research efforts continue to build more robustness into the 
method with one recent work proposing a methodology for 
transforming behaviour rules to a state machine to help detect 
intrusion into medical devices [9]. 
The foregoing methods are generally “probabilistic”, trained 
and tested on historical and new data for purposes of 
separating “normal” from “malicious” activities. Their 
generality and scope of coverage mean that they are typically 
likely to miss out on either detection, prevention or both. 
Tracking malicious packet activities within specific scope 
inevitably leads to “misclassification” errors with both to 
false positive and negative allocations. Further, new 
developments in data acquisition, storage and transmission 
bring about, not only new opportunities, but new security 
challenges too. For instance, the conventional perimeter 
security approaches previously used in data centres face 
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serious limitations in the Big Data and Cloud Computing era 
as security moves increasingly towards virtual machines [10]. 
In the next exposition, we outline the methods used to fulfil 
the two objectives in Section 1. 
3 Methods 
A large, high-dimensional dataset is required to train and test 
multiple algorithms on multiple samples. This section 
describes key aspects of the data attributes – generation, 
cleansing, exploration and preparation for mining as well as 
the mechanics of the proposed ensemble. 
3.1 Data Sources 
Data was obtained from thousands of raw network packets of 
the UNSW-NB1 15 created by the IXIA PerfectStorm tool in 
the Cyber Range Lab of the Australian Centre for Cyber 
Security (ACCS). The dataset, created using twelve 
algorithms [11] [2], running through the process in Figure 1 
(bottom) represent a matrix of attributes in the top panel of 
Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Data generation [2] (top) and resulting data 
attributes (below)   
                                                          
1 https://www.unsw.adfa.edu.au/australian-centre-for-
cyber-security/cybersecurity/ADFA-NB15-Datasets/  
The comma separated values (CSV) in Figure 1 represent a 
high-dimensional data denoted by  ȳ = [�௜௝], ݅ = ͳ,ʹ,͵, … , ݊ �݊݀ ݆ = ͳ,ʹ,͵, … , p             (1) 
where ݊ is the number of observations and � is the number of 
variables. Our analyses utilise 82,332 observations on 27 
variables. We denote the multivariate data as follows. X ⊂ ȳ | X =  [ݔ௜�], ݅ = ͳ,ʹ,͵, … , ݊ �݊݀ � = ͳ,ʹ,͵, … , m ≤ p 
(2) 
 
Figure 2: Attack types alongside “normal” traffic (LHS) 
and in tabular form (RHS) 
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The LHS panel in Figure 2 presents the class label with ten 
levels – nine attack types and the normal traffic whereas the 
RHS panel adds a binary class label combining all 9 attack 
types into one class and normal traffic in another. Our 
modelling strategy is outlined below.  
3.2 Modelling Strategy 
Assuming a correct classification incurs no loss, then given 
data X and two classes �ଵ,ଶ  a prediction rule is defined as ௉ሺ�|஼భሻ௉ሺ�|஼మሻ > �మభ௉ሺ஼మሻ�భమ௉ሺ஼భሻ  where �(�ଵ,ଶ)  are the class priors and ܿଶଵ/ଵଶ  represent the cost of incorrectly allocating an 
observation to a class which also implies that the probability 
of class given data is greater than the corresponding loss i.e., �ሺ�ଵ|�ሻ > �మభ�భమ+�మభ .  It can be shown that the Bayesian 
decision rule for minimum risk is the weighted sum Ȳ = ܿଵଶ�ሺ�ଵሻ�ଵ + ܿଶଵ�ሺ�ଶሻ�ଶ (3) 
where �ଵ  and �ଶ  are the probabilities of misclassifying �ଵ 
and �ଶ respectively [12]. Generally, 
Ȳ = ͳ݊ ∑ ℒሺ̂ݕ௜ , ݕ௜ሻ�௜=ଵ  where ℒሺ̂ݕ௜ , ݕ௜ሻ = {Ͳ     for ̂ݕ௜ = ݕ௜  ͳ    for ̂ݕ௜ ≠ ݕ௜ ሺͶሻ 
These parameters are data dependent with the empirical rule 
typically being associated with randomness due to the 
allocation region and randomness due to assessing the rule by 
random training and validation data [13] as exhibited in Table 
1. 
ALLOCATION RULE ERRORS DUE TO DATA 
RANDOMNESS 
POPN TRAINING XVAL TEST Ȳ஽,௉ை௉  Ȳ஽,்ோே Ȳ஽,஼�஽ Ȳ஽,்ௌ் 
Table 1:  Error types associated with domain-
partitioning modelling 
To minimise the error our algorithm repeatedly samples from 
the sub-space X ⊂ ȳ and applies multiple DT models for both 
training and testing as outlined below.  
3.2.1 Decision Trees and Random Forests 
If the data attributes in Section 3.1 are used, one at a time, to 
split the data into “normal” and “abnormal” flows by only 
considering the number of observations at node �∗  then, 
given the attribute ݔ௝ ∈ � and adopted threshold, the decision 
tree rule is defined as 
{�ଵ = {� ∈ �∗: ݔ௝ ≤ ݉�ଶ = {� ∈ �∗: ݔ௝ > ݉                (5) 
The observations in each of the two sets lie on either side of 
the hyper-plane ݔ௝ = ݉ chosen in such a way that a given 
measure of impurity is minimised. While training and testing 
this rule on different (random) datasets are the main causes of 
the variations in Table 1, other variations in decision tree 
model results derive from setting model parameters.  
3.2.2 Ensembled Implementation, Assessment and 
Comparison 
Random Forests [14] are constructed from X training samples 
drawn from ȳ with replacement with the number of variables 
also sampled from the total of 25, in our case. The procedure 
involves no pruning and so the error rate depends both on the 
multicollinearity of the trees as well as on the strength of 
individual trees in the forest. Dimensional reduction (i.e., 
reducing the number of predictor variables) reduces both 
multicollinearity and tree strength which makes p a crucial 
adjustable parameter. We circumvent this complex scenario 
by applying random forests with unaltered p and generating 
multiple versions of DT models to capture the consistency of 
predictor variables across the repeated runs as outlined in the 
algorithm below. This approach derives from bagging [5] but 
rather than just dividing � ⊂ ȳ into fixed training and test 
sets, multiple bootstrap training and testing samples are 
repeatedly drawn from with a fixed p. The two models are 
repeatedly trained and tested on these multiple samples, 
recording the key performance parameters – accuracy and 
optimality. Model optimisation and selection are finally done 
by harmonising data variability through cross-validation. 
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The algorithm learns a model �ሺ�ሻ = �⏟ሺ௫,௬ሻ~஽ [�ሺݔሻ ≠ ݕ] , 
where D is underlying distribution, and it provides the 
mechanics for assessing the models. Its outputs provide great 
insights into the overall behaviour of the data particularly 
how the attributes relate to the target variable.  
4 Data Analyses, Results and Discussions 
Optimal results of random forests obtained from multiple runs 
are presented in Figure 3 with an estimated Out-of-Bag (OOB) 
error of 18.41% obtained from training sample aggregation of 
1500 trees in the LHS panel while the predicted traffic 
structures are in the RHS panel.  
 
Figure 3: Optimal results of random forests obtained 
after multiple runs yielded a 18.41% OOB error 
As noted above, we circumvent the shortcomings of random 
forests by applying the algorithm in Section 3.2.2. One of its 
key outputs is the tree partitioning in Figure 4 with its overall 
results showing that the importance of the splitting variables 
is in the order sbytes (20), smean (11), dload (11), rate (11), 
sload (8), dur7, sttl (6), dbytes (6), dmean (5), dpkts (4), 
dloss (4), synack (3), tcprtt (3), sjit (2), ackdat (2), dinpkt 
(2), sloss (1), swin (1) and djit (1). Note that the order of the 
attack types (bottom bar charts) of Figure 4 is the same as in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 4: Individual random trees showing the main tree 
splitting variables and proportions at nodes 
 
The binary response version of the tree is shown in Figure 5 
the overall results of which order the importance of variables 
as follows: sttl  (14), dload (12), dbytes (7), dpkts, dloss, 
tcprtt, dmean, smean, dinpkt and synack (6), sjit, djit and 
ackdat (5), sbytes (3), sload (2) and rate, sinpkt, dttl, dur, 
spkts (1). This type of discretisation pools together all types 
of attacks versus normal flow and while it may look like 
masking information, it has greater protection potential than 
breaking them down in that the number of attributes required 
to identify intrusion is minimised. Performance comparisons 
of the two targets are provided below.  
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Figure 5: The binary target version of the tree model  
 
System administrators will typically be interested in 
identifying the specific nature of the attacks and while this 
knowledge may help them develop specialist deterrents, the 
dynamic behaviour of attacks can add an extra burden on 
them - both technically and financially. For example, the nine 
different attack types identified in this paper are likely to be 
highly dynamic and so it is reasonable to expect some attacks 
evolving into other previously unknown variants or two or 
more merging. A better option is probably being able to 
generalise – i.e., isolating normal from malicious data flow. 
Below is a comparative performance based on specific and 
general target variables. Figure 6 exhibits error plots based on 
the binary variable “label” with an OOB of just over 6% 
compare this to the 18.41% for the multi-level target above. 
 
Figure 6: Multiple DT models on the binary variable 
While it is technically obvious to see why the binary target 
yields more accurate results than the multi-level target 
variable, it is imperative to focus on the analytical impact of 
randomness in the intrusion types as implied in Table 1. One 
way of achieving that goal is to focus on the variability of the 
model results which is what this paper sought to achieve.  
 
Table 2: Performance of the algorithm on binary target 
data 
Various model variability outputs can be captured for 
comparative purposes. For DT models, for instance, these 
may include the key parameters in Table 2 - the complexity 
parameter, number of splits and variation of validation. We 
can assess the predictive performance of the model by 
looking at the root node error in conjunction with the values 
in this table. The relative error is equivalent to ͳ − Rଶ and it 
represents the error on the observations used to estimate the 
tree model. To avoid overfitting, the two errors and the 
standard deviation provide a guide as to when to stop growing 
the tree – typically RE + XST < CVE.  The training and 
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validation errors are obtained by multiplying RE and CVE by 
the XSTD respectively. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The random nature of analytical studies is the reason behind 
many comparative analyses-based classifier design, datasets 
used and other experimental setups. We presented an iterative 
algorithm that is trained and tested on multiple random 
datasets with the ultimate objectives being to identify key 
predictors of intrusion and predict likelihoods of future 
attacks. It is an ensemble of derivative data mining techniques 
embedded with data adaptation capabilities for intrusion 
detection. Its main idea is to combine existing domain 
knowledge and automated learning techniques for intrusion 
detection which fits in nicely with the overall objective of 
data mining – extraction knowledge from data [15]. The two 
examples drawn from binary and multi-level target variable 
were motivated by the fact that frameworks for attaining the 
two objectives are based on pre-defined ontologies with 
inherently highly dynamic parameters. These parameters tend 
to randomise not only the training and testing datasets, but 
also the predictive power of the models [16]. The proposed 
algorithm can be applied with many learning algorithms and 
as we seek to achieve generalisation rules in isolating 
malicious from normal data flows, we expect that this work 
will pave the way for more model comparisons across 
applications. 
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